We define a security notion for non-interactive key distribution protocols. We identify an apparently hard computational problem related to pairings, the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDH). After extending Sakai, Ohgishi, and Kasahara's pairing based protocol to a slightly more general setting, we show that breaking the system is polynomially equivalent to solving BDH in the random oracle model and thus establish a security proof.
m is chosen as the product of two primes p such that the maximal prime factor q of p − 1 is of medium size. To determine a private key, the PKG computes discrete logarithms modulo the prime factors of p − 1, which by Pollard's algorithm can be done with a complexity in O( √ q). An attacker may also profit from the special structure of the primes and factor n by Pollard's p − 1-method in time essentially O(q). The relatively small difference between the complexities for creating a key and for breaking the system induces an impractically high computational load on the PKG (cf. [14] ). An alternative protocol, suggested by Hühnlein et al. [10] , uses non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders. The PKG has to solve discrete logarithm problems in the class group of an imaginary quadratic field and in a finite field, and the fastest algorithm for the class group step known to date has a subexponential complexity with exponent 1 2 . A potential attacker is assumed to have to factor the discriminant, which can also be done in subexponential time with exponent 1 2 by the elliptic curve method. Hence, this scheme also requires that the PKG dispose of an enormous computing power, and the margin between instances not manageable by the PKG and instances vulnerable by attacks is very small. Furthermore, it is uncertain how well a choice of parameters falling into today's small margin of security will resist the exponential growth of computing power predicted by Moore's law.
In his diploma thesis [12] , Kügler develops a key distribution system based on the discrete logarithm problem in (Z/nZ) × for composite n, in which the PKG can compute private keys in polynomial time.
None of the above protocols come with a formal proof of security. The Weil and Tate pairings on elliptic curves have originally been introduced into cryptology to break certain elliptic curve cryptosystems [18, 8] . Recently, it was shown in [11, 21] that these pairings also present a constructive facet, namely that they can be used for establishing a tripartite Diffie-Hellman or a non-interactive key agreement protocol. Again, the protocols come without a formal security proof. Numerous applications have since then emerged, ranging from identity-based encryption [2] over interactive key agreement protocols [23] and short [3] or identity-based signatures [21, 6, 9, 20] to signcryption protocols [4, 15] .
In this article, we extend the non-interactive identity-based key distribution protocol of [21] to the setting of a very general pairing, whose properties are reviewed in Section 2. The protocol itself is described in Section 3. This generalisation is needed, for instance, to implement the protocol using the Weil pairing on ordinary elliptic curves, and it sheds new light on the precise prerequisites for setting up such a pairing based system. We identify an apparently hard problem, the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDH) (which is in fact a slight generalisation of the BDH introduced in [2] ). We proceed by defining a notion of security in Section 4, and we prove that in the random oracle model, breaking the protocol is polynomially equivalent to solving the BDH problem, see Section 5. In particular, assuming that the BDH problem is hard, the protocol is secure. Concrete implementations are obtained, for instance, from the Tate or Weil pairings on algebraic curves. In this setting, the PKG can compute private keys in polynomial time by a scalar multiplication on the curve. The effort for an adversary to solve the BDH problem, however, even when using the fastest algorithm known to date, is at least subexponential.
Pairings and the BDH problem
In the remaining sections, we let (G, +), (Ĝ, +) and (V , ×) denote groups of prime order . The sets of their nonneutral elements are denoted by G * ,Ĝ * and V * , respectively. We suppose that e : G ×Ĝ → V is a pairing satisfying the following properties:
• Bilinearity: e(aP , bQ) = e(P , Q) ab for all P ∈ G, Q ∈Ĝ, a, b ∈ Z.
• Non-degeneracy: there exist P ∈ G and Q ∈Ĝ such that e(P , Q) = 1. In our setting of prime order groups this is equivalent to e(P , Q) = 1 for all P ∈ G * , Q ∈Ĝ * .
• Computability: given P ∈ G and Q ∈Ĝ, the value e(P , Q) can be efficiently computed.
For instance, the Tate and Weil pairings on elliptic curves have these properties. If E is an elliptic curve defined over a finite field F q and is some prime number (for efficiency reasons taken to divide the cardinality of E), then the Tate and Weil pairings can be defined as pairings from the -torsion points E[ ] into some field extension F × q k . For k not too large, they can be computed efficiently. Choosing supersingular curves as originally proposed, one always has k 6, but it is unknown whether the use of these curves with their special and very rich algebraic structure might lead to security problems. Moreover, the value of k = 6 is only achievable in characteristic 3, otherwise k is at most 4. And to keep the discrete logarithm problems on the elliptic curve and in the finite field equally hard, larger values of k will be required in the near future. For instance, it is estimated that discrete logarithms in a finite field of 2048 bits are about as difficult to compute as on an elliptic curve of 200 bits, which corresponds to a value of k = 10. This requires the use of ordinary elliptic curves. In [21, 19] , it is shown how to obtain such curves for certain small values of k. Recently, constructions for ordinary curves with arbitrary values of k have been given [7, 1, 5] .
As E[ ] is of order 2 , and more precisely of type Z/ Z × Z/ Z, one has to choose subgroups of order for G andĜ. With the Tate pairing, it is hereby often possible to take G =Ĝ, while the antisymmetry of the Weil pairing in principle forces G andĜ to be distinct. For supersingular curves, one may sometimes define a modified Weil pairing on a single subgroup of order , using so-called distortion maps introduced by Verheul in [24] (see also [2, 3, 9] ). For ordinary curves, this is not possible, so that our generalisation to distinct G andĜ becomes necessary.
It turns out that the security of the key exchange protocol to be defined in Section 3 relies on the hardness of the following problem, baptised the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDH): given (P , Q, aP , bQ, cP , cQ), compute e (P , Q) abc . This is the same problem as the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem introduced in [2] , except that we allow the groups G andĜ to be different. A probabilistic algorithm A is said to (t, )-solve BDH in (G,Ĝ, V , e) if A runs in time at most t and correctly solves the problem with probability at least , that is,
The probability is taken over the uniformly and independently distributed P ∈ G * , Q ∈Ĝ * and a, b, c ∈ F × and over the random choices of A.
The non-interactive key distribution protocol
Formalising the protocol of [21] and extending it to the framework of general pairings introduced in the previous section, the key sharing protocol can be naturally divided into four distinct algorithms: Setup, Master-key generation, Private key distribution and Common secret computation.
• Setup: choose G,Ĝ, V and e as in Section 2, and let H : {0, 1} * → G * andĤ : {0, 1} * →Ĝ * be cryptographic hash functions (in the case where G andĜ are torsion subgroups of an elliptic curve, these may be derived from common cryptographic hash functions using techniques described, for instance, in [3] ). All these parameters are publicly known.
• Master-key generation: the PKG chooses a random master-key s ∈ {1, . . . , − 1}.
• Private key distribution: whenever a user A first wishes to use the system, he contacts the PKG and asks for his private key pair. Using A's identity ID A , the PKG computes A's private key pair
and sends it to A. • Common secret computation: suppose that users A and B wish to create a common secret key. A computes B's public key
(P B , Q B ) = (H (ID B ),Ĥ (ID B ))
and conversely B computes
(P A , Q A ) = (H (ID A ),Ĥ (ID A )).
Then A can compute
(e(S A , Q B ), e(P B ,Ŝ A ))
and B can compute
(e(P A ,Ŝ B ), e(S B , Q A )).
The bilinearity of e makes it easy to see that the computed tuples are in fact equal and thus constitute a secret shared between A and B.
Definition of security for non-interactive key distribution
In the non-interactive cryptographic setting of the previous section, the only observable traffic is the distribution of private keys. It is thus natural to consider the protocol secure if the corruption of an arbitrary number of private keys does not reveal the shared secret between two further participants. In particular, a colluding group of participants who reveal their private keys to one another then does not gain any insight into other people's common secrets. Precisely, an adversary A is said to (t, )-break the protocol if it runs in time at most t and has advantage at least in the following game.
• Setup: the challenger publishes the general system parameters, namely (G,Ĝ, V , , e, H,Ĥ 
Security proof
In this section, we show that the BDH problem and the security of the non-interactive key distribution protocol of Section 3 are polynomially equivalent. Specialised to the case G =Ĝ, our results yield a security proof for the original key distribution protocol of [21] .
Proposition 1. If the BDH problem in some setting (G,Ĝ, V , , e) can be (t, )-solved, then the key distribution protocol in the setting (G,Ĝ, V , , e, H,Ĥ ) can be (t + , )-broken. Hereby, is the time needed to carry out one extraction query, to compute two hash values of H and ofĤ and to carry out O(log ) group operations in G,Ĝ, V and
Proof. By issuing one key extraction query on an arbitrary identity and computing the hash values H andĤ of this identity, an attacker on the protocol obtains two pairs (P , sP ) and (Q, sQ) with P ∈ G * and Q ∈Ĝ * . After multiplying these with two uniformly and independently chosen integers from {1, . . . , −1}, we may hereby assume that P and Q are uniformly and independently distributed over G * resp.Ĝ * .Multiplying only the right hand sides with a random element ∈ {1, . . . , − 1} replaces them by cP and cQ with c = s uniformly distributed. The attacker then randomly selects two identities ID A and ID B and two elements , ∈ {1, . . . , − 1} and computes R = H (ID A ) and S = Ĥ (ID B ). Hereby, R = aP and S = bQ for some (unknown) a and b.
In the BDH instance (P , Q, R, S, cP , cQ), the random variables P, Q, a, b and c are now uniformly and independently distributed. Solving the BDH problem provides the attacker with v = e (H (ID A ),Ĥ (ID B )) s . He then computes r = ( ) −1 in F × and raises v to the power r, which yields the shared secret between A and B. Notice that in general, t will be t times some polynomial in log , and log t since A's output is an element of V, so that in fact t is polynomial in t. The assumption that an upper bound q E on the number of extraction queries of A or, a fortiori, on its running time t q E be known by B, certainly shows limitations of the theorem. However, it seems to be commonly adopted in the literature, cf. [2, 3] .
Theorem 2. Let the hash functions H andĤ be given by random oracles. Suppose that there is some adversary A who (t, )-breaks the protocol with parameters (G,Ĝ, V , , e, H,Ĥ ). Assume furthermore that an upper bound q E on the number of extraction queries issued by
Proof. B has as input a random and uniformly distributed instance
of the BDH problem. For finding the solution e(P , Q) abc with A's assistance, B has control over the hash functions H andĤ . Basically, when queried for a hash value of, say, H, it outputs a random group element, obtained as a random multiple of P or P a . Thus B conforms to the random oracle model (to A, the hash function appears as a random function) while at the same time keeping track of additional information (the discrete logarithms with respect to the bases P or P a ). Of course, as a is unknown to B, it may control only one of the discrete logarithms. To be able to answer to extraction queries, B should attach multiples of P to the corresponding identities; to retrieve the solution to the BDH problem, it should attach a multiple of P a to the identity for which A finally emits its guess. These requirements put B into a dilemma, because A may request hash values before deciding to query the private key or to emit a guess for the corresponding identity. To solve the problem, B randomly goes for multiples of P or P a and declares failure whenever it realises that it has made the wrong choice previously. The probabilities of selecting P or P a must depend on q E , since otherwise B's success probability becomes exponentially small for q E tending to infinity. The more extraction queries A makes, the more often B has to return a multiple of P. This is the reason why B needs to know at least an upper bound on q E , and furthermore its success probability decreases the more private keys A extracts. In detail, B implements the following routines: • picks u ∈ {0, 1} with Prob(u = 0) = , where is a parameter to be determined later
H queries: These are handled in the same way, B keeping a listL and returning a multiple of Q with probability and a multiple of Q b with probability 1 − .
Extraction queries: To answer to a query issued by A upon the string ID, the algorithm B:
• queries H andĤ as described above to make sure that L contains a tuple of the form (ID, R, h, u) andL a tuple of the form (ID, S,ĥ,û) • checks if u = 1 orû = 1, in which case it reports failure • computes the tuple (hP c ,ĥQ c ) and sends it to A Guess: Upon receiving the guess (ID A , ID B , , ) where the last equality follows from the bilinearity of the pairing. A similar analysis for t = 1 shows that B guesses correctly with an additional probability of p A,2 /2. Since these two events are disjoint, B's guess is correct with a total probability of (p A,1 + p A,2 )/2 /2 whenever it does not abort.
We now compute the probability for B to abort. Let q E be the number of extraction queries issued by A. Then the probability of non-abortion during each extraction query being 2 and the probability of non-abortion during the guess phase being (1 − ) 2 , the overall probability of non-abortion is at least (as q E has been taken to be an upper bound on the actual number of extraction queries) 2q E (1 − ) 2 . Minimising this function, we find the optimal value = q E /(1 + q E ) and an overall probability of non-abortion of at least 1/(exp(1)(1 + q E )) 2 . Hence, the probability that B outputs the correct solution to the BDH instance is at least /(2 exp (1) 2 (1 + q E ) 2 ). The running time analysis of B is straightforward.
Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 show that the BDH problem and the key distribution protocol are polynomially equivalent, and describe accurately how the running times and success probabilities are transformed during the reductions. Assuming that the BDH problem is hard, the security of the protocol is thus established.
It is possible to furthermore formalise the security notion from a complexity theoretic point of view. To do so, it is necessary to introduce infinite families of problem instances. Let thus F = ((G k ,Ĝ k , V k , k , e k )) k∈N be a family of BDH parameters as above. We say that F satisfies the polynomial BDH assumption if, for any polynomials P and Q in Z[X], there is no randomised algorithm A that (P (k), 1/Q(k))-solves the BDH problem for (G k ,Ĝ k , V k , k , e k ) for all k ∈ N. The above proof shows that under the random oracle model, if F satisfies the polynomial BDH assumption, then the protocol with parameters from F is secure in the sense that no polynomial time algorithm achieves a polynomial advantage in breaking the protocol.
Conclusion
We have defined a notion of security for non-interactive key distribution protocols. Slightly generalising the pairing based protocol of [21] , we have shown that the scheme satisfies this security property in the random oracle model if the BDH assumption holds for the involved pairing. In particular, the protocol is secure against an arbitrary number of colluding attackers.
